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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. : Case No. 21028 
RICHARD LAWRENCE JENSEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, §76-6-302(1)(a)(1953 as amended), in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge, Presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged by information with the offense of 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated §76-6-302(1)(a) (1953 as amended). The case was 
tried to a jury on June 5th and 6th, 1985. On June 6th, 1985, 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the informa-
tion. On October 21st, 1985, appellant was ordered to serve an 
indeterminate sentence of five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison, in addition to a one year enhancement for the use of a 
weapon. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this court reversing the 
judgment and conviction rendered against him, and remanding this 
case to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial, or in 
the alternative for dismissal, 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented in this appeal is: was the admission 
at trial of evidence of other bad acts or crimes contained in 
letters written by the appellant prejudicial to him, thereby re-
quiring a reversal of his conviction? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The state called Mr. Harry Leisure as its first witness 
at trial. Mr. Leisure testified that on February llthr 1985, he 
was employed by the Radio Shack Company (R. 150). Mr, Leisure 
indicated that at approximately 7:45 p.m. that night, he was 
robbed by a suspect who he later identified as the appellant. 
(R. 151). 
When the suspect first entered the store Mr. Leisure and 
one other customer, Jeff Treseder, were the only persons present. 
(R. 151). Mr. Leisure initially approached the suspect and asked 
if he could assist him. (R. 151). The suspect said that he was 
"just looking". (R. 151-152). Mr. Leisure indicated at this 
point he looked into the suspect's face at a distance of approxi-
mately two feet (R. 151). 
A few minutes later, after Mr. Treseder had left, the 
suspect approached the sales counter, showed a gun, and told Mr. 
Leisure to empty the cash drawer (R. 152). Mr. Leisure described 
the suspect as being approximately six feet to six feet one and 
one-half inches tall and weiqhing approximately 240-245 pounds. 
(R. 160). 
After identifying appellant in open court (R. 155)
 f Mr. 
Leisure stated that he had seen a photograph of appellant approx-
imately three or four days after the robbery (R. 171). However, 
he also admitted that he had seen a photograph of someone else 
who looked familiar (R. 175-176). 
Jeff Treseder then testified and confirmed that he had 
seen the suspect in the store on February 11th (R. 191). However, 
he could not identify appellant either in court or after having 
been shown a photograph of him (R. 195). Later, Deputy Daryl 
Ondrak testified that he had shown Mr. Treseder a number of 
photographs and that he picked out a person other than appellant, 
who "most closely resembled" the suspect (R. 215). 
After the state rested, defense counsel called Terry 
Harris* to the stand as an alibi witness (R. 244). Miss Harris 
testified that she had met appellant in January and worked with 
him during the months of January and February, 1985. (R. 245). 
During this time, Miss Harris and appellant became involved in a 
boyfriend-girlfriend type relationship (p.. 245). 
She stated, with relation to this incident, that she 
and appellant were together at his apartment during the entire 
evening of February 11th (R. 249-250). She also testified that, 
after appellant was arrested for the instant offense, she received 
numerous letters from him (R. 252). 
1. This witness had originally been called by the state to 
identify appellant's baseball cap, which had been seized by 
police officers when he was arrested. (See Record, pages 225-
230). 
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Subsequently, the state moved for the admission of one 
of these letters2 (R. 275-272). Defense counsel objected to the 
letter being admitted. However, at this point in time, both 
defense counsel and counsel for the state had a discussion at the 
bench, the contents of which were not recorded (R. 276). After 
this discussion was completed, the state then moved again for 
introduction of the letter, and defense counsel again objected 
"for reasons given". (R. 276). The court then noted the objec-
tion and admitted the letter without further comment (R. 276). 
Later on, the state moved for admission of a second 
letter^, which was objected to by defense counsel for the same 
reason "as before". (R. 284). The letter was also received by 
the court (R. 284). 
After both sides rested and the jury had been instructed 
and had retired to deliberate, defense counsel indicated it was 
her understanding that these two letters were not in fact going 
to the jury. (R. 397). The court responded by stating that 
counsel had misconstrued the ruling. (R. 397). However, counsel 
then noted that she had understood that these letters would not 
go to the jury room because one of them contained information 
pertaining to appellant's apparent commitment on a separate and 
unrelated offense arising out of Davis County. (R. 397). Finally, 
the court instructed defense counsel that she should have made 
the objection at the time the letters were admitted, thus her 
2. This letter was identified as state's exhibit #16 (see 
addendum). 
3. This letter was identified as state's exhibit #17. 
objection was not timely (R. 400). However, the record does in 
fact indicate that the objections were made at the proper time. 
The confusion arises from the fact that counsel apparently assumed, 
after the discussion at the bench, that the letters, because of 
their prejudicial content, were being admitted on the condition 
that these prejudicial matters would not be shown to the jury. 
After deliberating for just over four hours, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the information. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is appellant's contention that the trial court's 
admission of the letter in the instant case constituted reversible 
error. Because the letter contained reference to another crime 
or bad act on appellant's part, it had the effect of showing a 
propensity to commit crime and, therefore, its admission violated 
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Appellant will also argue that trial counsel did in 
fact comply with the "contemporaneous objection" rule, even 
though the basis for the objection was not placed on the record 
until after the jury had retired to deliberate. 
ARGUMENT 
This court has made it clear that evidence of prior bad 
acts is not admissable for the purpose of disgracing the defendant 
or showing a propensity to commit crime. State v. Wells, Utah, 
603 P.2d 810 (1979); State v. Mason, Utah, 699 P.2d 795 (1975). 
In State v. Saunders, Utah, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), 
the defendant was convicted of burglary, theft, possession of a 
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firearm by a restricted person, and of being a habitual criminal* 
On appeal, he argued that the trial court had committed error by 
refusing to sever the firearm count from the others. 
In analyzing the severance issue, the supreme court 
noted that, because of the element of "restricted personw in the 
firearm offense: 
evidence that defendant was at the time of 
the offenses committed to the Utah State 
Prison and living in a halfway house would 
have been inadmissable at trial on the bur-
glary and theft charges. This evidence 
clearly implied that defendant had committed 
a prior crime. (Ld. at 741). 
After noting that the evidence pertaining to the firearm 
charges was not at all relevant to the other two offenses, the 
court went on to explain the justification for the general prin-
ciple involved: 
The basis of these limitations [Rule 55 of 
the former rules of evidence] on the admis-
sibility of evidence of prior crimes is the 
tendency of a fact finder to convict the 
accused because of bad character rather than 
because he is shown to be guilty of the 
offense charged. Because of this tendency 
such evidence is presumed prejudicial and, 
absent a reason for the admission of the 
evidence other than to show criminal dispo-
sition, the evidence is excluded. (1x3. at 
741) . 
Appellant submits that the facts involved in the instant 
case fit squarely within the holding and rationale of Saunders. 
Here, the evidence as to appellant being the robber was heavily 
disputed, in that appellant presented an alibi defense in which 
he testified on his own behalf and denied committing the robbery. 
Also, of the two persons who observed the robber on the 
night of February 11th, 1985, only one was able to identify him. 
At the same time, the witness admitted that he felt he had somehow 
recognized the face of another individual whose photo was shown 
to him by police officers to be familiar. With this conflict in 
the evidence, it is clear that the introduction to the jury of 
appellant's apparent criminal conviction in another county could 
easily have caused the jury to convict him because of his bad 
character rather than because he was shown to have been guilty of 
the offense charged. 
Although Saunders was decided at a time when the "old" 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence was still in effect, appel-
lant submits that the result would still be the same under our 
new rules. 
Rule 55 provided: 
[E]vidence that a person committed a crime 
or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is 
inadmissable to prove his disposition to 
commit crime or civil wrong as the basis 
for an inference that he committed another 
crime or civil wrong on another specified 
occasion but...such evidence is admissable 
when relevant to prove some other material 
fact • . • 
Rule 55 was superceded by the new Rule 404 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, which became effective on September 1, 1983. 
Rule 404 provides, in pertinent part: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissable to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissable for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, pre-
paration, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
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Appellant submits that both the old Rule 55 and the new 
Rule 404 are virtually identical in following the general rule. 
In addition, the court in Saunders did not indicate, either 
expressly or impliedly, that cases coming before it under the new 
Rule 404 will end up with a different result than the old Rule 55 
cases. 
In State v. Holder, Utah, 649 P.2d 583 (1984), the 
defendant was convicted of theft of an operable motor vehicle.4 
At trial, the state introduced evidence that the defendant and 
another suspect were arrested while in possession of a vehicle 
that had been reported stolen. However, in addition, the state, 
over defense counsel's objection, introduced evidence that defen-
dant and his co-defendant had earlier been involved in an aggra-
vated robbery while in the stolen vehicle. 
In reversing the defendant's conviction and ordering a 
new trial, the court held: 
[T]he merely cumulative character of the 
robbery evidence on the element of knowledqe 
and intent regarding the theft charge is 
significant because it hiqhliqhts the 
limited value this evidence has when weiqhed 
against the substantial possibility that a 
jury would be prejudiced by evidence of 
[appellant's] commission of another crime. 
Such evidence of the commission of other 
crimes must be used with extreme caution 
because of the prejudicial effect it may 
have on the finder of fact. (at 584). 
See State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 274, 2788, 
114 P.2d 205, 207 (1941); State v. Anderton, 
81 Utah 320, 323-24, 17 P.2d 917, 918 
(1983); State v. McGowan, 66 Utah 223, 226-
28, 241 P 314, 315-16 (1925) . 
4. This case also dealt with the "old" Rule 55 rather than the 
new Rule 404. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the instant case 
should be reversed as was Holder because the trial court did not 
use the "extreme caution" required in the instant case when it 
allowed this knowinqly prejudicial material to be admitted and 
given to the jury. In fact, at one point during the trial, the 
court reminded the prosecutor that he would not be able to ques-
tion appellant with regard to his prior misdemeanor convictions 
(See Record P. 250). Yet, it nevertheless admitted the letters 
in their entirety so as to allow the jury to see what the court 
had expressly forbidden the prosecutor from pursuing. 
In State v. Kazda, Utah, 382 P.2d 407 (1963), the 
defendant appealed from a jury conviction for assault with intent 
to commit murder and robbery. At trial, the prosecutor was able 
to elicit from an F.B.I, agent statements made to him by the 
defendant regarding his arrest in another state for an unrelated 
armed robbery. In reversing, the supreme court held that this 
extraneous information: 
implied that the defendant was implicated 
in other crimes, none of them proven, and 
could have no other effect than to degrade 
the defendant and give to the jury the 
impression that he had a propensity for 
crime. See also; State v. Peterson, Utah, 
457 P.2d 532 (1968); State v. Dickson, Utah, 
361 P.2d 412 (1961). 
Again, appellant submits that the effect of the admis-
sion of "other crimes" in the instant case probably had the 
effect of degrading the appellant and giving the jury the impres-
sion that he had a propensity for crime. 
Appellant further submits that the error committed in the 
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instant case was prejudicial thus precluding an assertion of 
harmless error by the state. As the court stated in Kazda, 
supra, it would be difficult in the instant case to "say with any 
degree of assurance that there would not have been a different 
result" in the absence of such evidence.5 (JU3. at 409). In 
addition, because of the extreme danger inherent in the admission 
of this type of evidence, this court has ruled that there is a 
presumption of prejudice whenever this error occurs. (See, 
Saunders, supra, at 741). For these reasons, appellant submits 
that the admission of "prior bad acts" in the instant case, 
cloaked with the "presumption of prejudice", was in fact pre-
judicial and therefore entitles him to a new trial. 
Finally, the remaininq issue in this arqument deals 
with the trial court's ruling that defense counsel's objection to 
the prejudicial evidence was not timely. Therefore, the court 
overruled her objection. 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides, in 
pertinent part: 
Error may not be predicated upon a rulinq 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, 
and 
(1) objection. In case the ruling is 
one admitting evidence, a timely objection 
or motion to strike appears of record, 
stating the specific ground of objection, 
if the specific ground was not apparent 
from the context;... 
In State v. McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982), our 
5. The Kazda court was quoting State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 
361 P.2d 412 (1961). 
supreme court dealt with the "contemporaneous objection rule". 
There, the appellant's trial counsel had objected to the admission 
of a number of "mug shots" on the basis that the state had not 
set a proper foundation. On appeal, it was contended that the 
"mug shots" were objectionable because they were identified as 
having been taken at a police station. In addition, the reverse 
sides of the photos referred to the defendant's possible involve-
ment in other crimes. 
In finding that the appellant's trial counsel had 
failed to comply with the rule,6 the court cited and supported 
the Kansas Supreme Court, which had stated that: 
The contemporaneous objection rule long 
adhered to in this state requires timely 
and specific objection to admission of 
evidence in order for the question of 
admissibility to be considered on appeal. 
The rule is a salutory procedural tool 
serving a legitimate state purpose. By 
making use of the rule, counsel gives the 
trial court the opportunity to conduct the 
6. The Rule of Evidence at the time McCardell was decided was 
Rule 4. It provided: 
A verdict of finding shall not be set aside 
nor shall the judgment or decision based 
thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a) 
there appears of record objection to the 
evidence timely interposed and so stated as 
to make clear the specific ground of ob-
jection, and (b) the court which passes 
upon the effect of the error or errors is 
of the opinion that the admitted evidence 
should have been excluded on the ground 
stated and probably had a substantial in-
fluence in bringing about the verdict or 
finding. However, the court in its dis-
cretion, and in the interests of justice, 
may review the erroneous admission of evi-
dence even though the grounds of the objec-
tion thereto are not correctly stated. 
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trial without using the tainted evidence, 
and thus avoid possible reversal and a new 
trial. Furthermore, the rule is practically 
one of necessity if litigation is ever to 
end. State v. Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543 
P.2d 923 (1975); quoting Baker v. State, 
204 Kan. 607, 611, 464 P.2d 212, 216 (1970). 
The McCardell court then stated that in the instant 
case there was no indication on the record that the trial court 
had been in any way alerted to the prejudicial nature on the back 
of the "mug shots". Based on this omission, the court followed 
the rule in refusing to hear the argument. 
Appellant submits that the instant case is far different 
from the facts present in McCardell. Here, defense counsel ob-
jected to the introduction of the letters at the time they were 
admitted. When defense counsel brought up the issue after closing 
argument, she indicated that the basis for her objection had been 
stated at the bench. Based on that objection, she had believed 
the court's ruling would be to not allow the prejudicial evidence 
to be admitted. 
The record, at this point, accurately reflected what 
the evidence was as well as the basis for the objection thereto. 
Thus, it is clear that defense counsel "directed the court's 
attention" to the prejudicial evidence when it was admitted. The 
only problem occurs where the basis is not actually put on the 
record until after the evidence was admitted. And it appears 
clear that the only reason for this omission was counsel's misun-
derstanding as to the court's ruling. Surely, this issue should 
not be precluded simply because the court and counsel had a 
misunderstanding as to the letters' admission. 
Part of the reason for the problem in this case also 
originates from the nature of the questioned letters. Because 
the letters were read, for the most part, in open court, they 
undoubtedly were admissable as to the matters so divulged. 
However, the confusion arose as to the proposed "deletion" of the 
prejudicial parts from the legitimately admissable sections. 
Again, because counsel voiced her objections at the time the 
evidence was admitted and because she later was able to put her 
basis for such objection on the record, she therefore complied 
with the requirements of Rule 103 and the rule of McCardell. 
Thus, appellant respectfully submits that this court should 
decide the issue raised. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests this court, for the 
reasons stated above, to reverse and remand this case to District 
Court for a new trial, or, in the alternative, order it to 
be dismissed. 
Dated this day of May, 1986. 
EARL XAIZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed/delivered to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114, on this day of May, 1986. 
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